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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
David D. Hopper*
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia courts and the General Assembly have effected a
number of changes in civil practice and procedure during the
past year. This article focuses on some significant developments
of interest to the general litigation attorney. Matters affecting
real property and juvenile and domestic relations are treated
elsewhere in this volume.
II. RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
In Transdulles Center, Inc. v. Sharma,1 the Supreme Court
of Virginia explicitly rejected the position of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments2 and federal court decisions 3 that a default judgment may not be used as the basis for a finding of
collateral estoppel. Transdulles involved a tenant who had allowed a judgment by default to be entered in a general district
court action for wrongful detainer in which the landlord had
also recovered delinquent rent. In a subsequent action, the
tenant was precluded from contesting his liability for additional
rent due under the lease. The supreme court reasoned that,
although application of collateral estoppel requires that the
issue in question actually have been litigated in a prior pro-

* Director, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. A-B., 1983, magna
cum laude, Harvard University, J.D., 1989, Order of the Coif, University of Virginia.
1. 252 Va. 20, 472 9.E.2d 274 (1996).
2. Section 27 cmt. e (1982).
3. E.g., United States v. Ringley, 750 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Va. 1990), afl'd, 985
F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1993).
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ceeding 4 "Virginia law does not support a blanket exemption
from the application of collateral estoppel in the case of a default judgment."5 In the case under consideration, the plaintiff
in the first action had presented evidence at the ex parte hearing in district court. That ex parte presentation of evidence was
sufficient to make the issue of the tenant's liability under the
lease one that was "actually litigated" for collateral estoppel
purposes.'
The supreme court used the presentation of evidence by the
plaintiff in Transdulles to distinguish its holding from that in
Horton v. Morrison,7 in which the supreme court held that a
default judgment in a negligence action could not be the basis
for application of collateral estoppel because "no issues relating
to ... negligence were actually litigated when the court entered
a default judgment ...."8

In Waterfront Marine Construction, Inc. v. North End 49ers
Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, B, and C,9 the supreme court
addressed the issue of whether an arbitration award could bar
a subsequent arbitration proceeding under the doctrine of res
judicata.' ° Although the parties did not dispute the fact that
the doctrine could bar a subsequent arbitration proceeding-and
thus the supreme court's discussion of the issue was dicta-the
case makes clear that there is no rational reason why the doctrine should not apply to decisions reached by arbitration.
The supreme court went on to decide that, in the absence of
a clear agreement to the contrary, the issue of whether the
doctrine of res judicata should apply to bar a subsequent arbitration is not itself arbitrable." In Waterfront, the contractual

4. See Angstadt v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 249 Va. 444, 446, 457 S.E.2d 86, 87
(1995); Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671, 202 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1974).
5. Transdulles, 252 Va. at 23, 472 S.E.2d at 276.
6. Id.
7. 248 Va. 304, 448 S.E.2d 629 (1994).
8. Transdulles, 252 Va. at 25, 472 S.E.2d at 277.
9. 251 Va. 417, 468 S.E.2d 894 (1996).
10. Because the parties made no distinction in their argument between a confirmed arbitration award and an unconfirmed award, the supreme court assumed,
without deciding, that "an unconfirmed arbitration award is treated in the same manner as a confirmed award for purposes of res judicata analysis." Id. at 431, 468
S.E.2d at 901.
11. Id. at 432-33, 468 S.E.2d at 903.

1996]

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

1261

arbitration provision was a typical agreement to arbitrate any
controversy or claim "arising out of or relating to the Contract
or the breach thereof."' The supreme court explained that the
parties' dispute over the application of a plea of res judicata
arose from or was related to "satisfying the elements of this
common law doctrine" and was not related to the terms of the
parties' contract. 3
The supreme court also noted that "an arbitration panel is
not generally bound by legal principles, does not have to explain or justify its decision, and the decision is not reviewed for
legal errors."'4 Consequently, allowing an arbitration panel to
resolve a plea of res judicata would tend to "defeat[] the purpose of the judicially created doctrine-to bring an end to the
substantive controversy and to protect the parties from re-litigating previously decided matters." 5
In Reed v. Liverman,'9 the supreme court held that where a
case was settled and an order was entered dismissing the litigation "with prejudice," that order barred a subsequent action
because the order had been circulated to counsel prior to entry
and there was no evidence that the wording of the order was
in~dvertent 7
B. Making a Record
In a pair of cases decided on the same day, the Supreme
Court of Virginia reminded trial lawyers of the importance of
properly preserving objections concerning jury instructions. King
v. Sowers' was a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff objected to an instruction at trial on the ground that it was
inapplicable under the facts of the case. On appeal, the
plaintiff argued that the instruction was not only inapplicable
under the facts adduced at trial but also that it contained an

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 421, 468 S.E.2d at 896.
Id. at 432-33, 468 S.E.2d at 903.
Id. at 433, 468 S.E.2d at 903.
Id.
250 Va. 97, 458 S.E.2d 446 (1995).
Id. at 100, 458 S.E.2d at 447.
252 Va. 71, 471 S.E.2d 481 (1996).
Id. at 77, 471 S.E.2d at 484.
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2
incorrect statement of the lawY.
Although the supreme court
agreed that the instruction misstated the law, it held that "the
instruction became the law of the case because the objection at21
trial did not challenge the legal content of the instruction.
Because the objection the plaintiff had raised at trial was not
well founded, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.22

Morgen Industries, Inc. v. Vaughan 3 was a products liability
case in which the defendant manufacturer complained of the
trial court's refusal to grant certain instructions. The supreme
court agreed with the plaintiff-appellee that the manufacturer
was procedurally barred from raising any issue concerning the
instructions because the record failed to show that the manufacturer had made the arguments below that it then sought to
raise on appeal.' The manufacturer thus ran afoul of Virginia
Supreme Court Rule 5:25, which provides that "[e]rror will not
be sustained to any ruling of the trial court... unless the
objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of
the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court
to attain the ends of justice." 5
At trial, the circuit court considered the jury instructions
outside the presence of the court reporter. Consequently, on
appeal, the court was "presented only with the instructions
marked 'refused' by the trial court, along with citations to various cases at the bottom of the refused instructions."5 Because
"[a] case can often be cited for numerous propositions, and the
trial court is not required to determine sua sponte what argument a party may be entitled to make under a given case," the
presence of citations at the bottom of the refused instructions
was insufficient
to preserve the manufacturer's objections for
27
appeal.

20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Medical Ctr. Hosps. v. Sharpless, 229 Va. 496, 498, 331 S.E.2d 405,
406 (1985); Norfolk & Portsmouth R.R. v. Barker, 221 Va. 924, 928, 275 S.E.2d 613,
615 (1981)).
22. Id. at 78, 471 S.E.2d at 484.
23. 252 Va. 60, 471 S.E.2d 489 (1996).
24. Id. at 67-68, 471 S.E.2d at 493.
25. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:25.
26. Morgen, 252 Va. at 68, 471 S.E.2d at 494.
27. Id.
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Taken together, these two cases make certain the importance
of preserving a clear, comprehensive record concerning arguments over instructions in the trial court.
C. Evidence
1. Expert Opinions
In David A Parker Enterprises, Inc. v. Templeton,28 a divided Supreme Court of Virginia continued to wrestle with the
boundaries of acceptable expert testimony. The plaintiff alleged
that he was injured when struck by a rotating propeller on an
outboard motor being operated by the defendant's employeeY
The employee denied that the boat's engine was in gear when
the accident occurred." Over the defendant's objection, one of
plaintiffs physicians was allowed to testify that the plaintiff's
injuries "were caused by 'a rotating prop[eller]" and another
treating physician was allowed to opine that the injuries were
caused by "'a propeller [that was] in motion." 3 This testimony
bolstered the plaintiffs theory that the employee had been
negligent in operating the boat in plaintiffs vicinity while the
engine was in gear.
On appeal, the supreme court held that
the doctors' opinion that the boat's propeller was rotating
clearly invaded the province of the jury on this vital issue
because the jury was equally as capable as were the doctors
of reaching an intelligent and informed opinion and of
drawing its own conclusions from the facts and circumstances of the case. 2
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Keenan, joined by Justice
Lacy, pointed out that the testimony should have been admissible under Virginia Code section 8.01-401.3(B), which states that
"[n]o expert ... witness while testifying in a civil proceeding
shall be prohibited from expressing an otherwise admissible

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

251 Va. 235, 467 S.E.2d 488 (1996).
Id. at 236, 467 S.E.2d at 489.
Id.
Id. at 237, 467 S.E.2d at 489-90.
Id. at 237-38, 467 S.E.2d at 489-90.
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opinion or conclusion as to any matter of fact solely because
that fact is the ultimate issue or critical to the resolution of the
case." 33 The supreme court's majority opinion does not cite to
or discuss this statute.
In CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Casale,' the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that an expert economist's testimony concerning
a plaintiffs future lost income was improperly admitted. The
testimony was based on the invalid assumption that the plaintiff would either never work again or would be able to work at
only a minimum wage job.35 Although several physicians testified to the plaintiffs continued physical impairment and a vocational rehabilitation expert testified that the plaintiff would be
limited to sedentary employment at the minimum wage, the
plaintiffs own testimony was that he was employed by CSX at
the time of trial and was planning to report for work in a new,
skilled position on the Monday following conclusion of the
36
trial.
The supreme court therefore applied the rule of Massie v.
Firmstone7 and held that the plaintiff was bound by his own
testimony, which showed that the lost income testimony was
based on an invalid assumption. 8 The court explained that
Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1, which allows an expert to
express an opinion without initially disclosing its basis, "'does
not.., relieve the court from its responsibility, when proper
objection is made, to determine whether the factors required to
be included in formulating the opinion were actually utilized."' 9 Because the opinion was based on an assumption inconsistent with the plaintiffs own testimony, "the question
before the trial court was one of the admissibility of evidence,
not its weight-a strictly legal question."'

33. Id. 238-39, 467 S.E.2d at 490-91 (Keenan, J., dissenting) (quoting VA. CODE

ANN. § 8.01-401.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
34.
35.
36.
37.

250 Va. 359, 463 S.E.2d 445 (1995).
Id. at 362, 463 S.E.2d at 447.
Id. at 363-64, 463 S.E.2d at 448.
134 Va. 450, 462, 114 S.E. 652, 656 (1922).

38. Casale, 250 Va. at 364, 463 S.E.2d at 448.
39. Id. at 365-66, 463 S.E.2d at 449 (quoting Swiney v. Overby, 237 Va. 231, 233,
377 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1989)).
40. Id. at 367, 463 S.E.2d at 450.
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2. Spoliation
In Gentry v. Toyota Motor Corp.,4 the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered the circumstances under which a party may
be sanctioned for spoliation of evidence by that party's expert.
The case involved claims arising out of an accident that occurred when one of the plaintiffs lost control of her Toyota
truck and crashed into a ravine. The plaintiffs' attorney hired a
self-styled sudden acceleration expert who, without receiving
authorization from anyone, used a hacksaw to cut into the
truck's instrument panel and remove a temperature control
cable.' After a hearing at which Toyota's expert testified that
the plaintiffs' expert's conduct had prevented him from evaluating whether the temperature control cable had been involved in
causing the accident, the plaintiffs moved to amend their motion for judgment to allege a new cause of the accident based
on the anticipated opinion of a new expert.' That new opinion
attributed the cause of the crash to a carburetor problem unrelated to the temperature control cable." Toyota's expert acknowledged that his evaluation of the plaintiffs' new theory was
not affected by anything the plaintiffs' first expert had done to
the vehicle.'
Nevertheless, the trial court granted Toyota's motion to dismiss based on the first expert's spoliation of evidence." On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia applied the abuse of discretion standard appropriate for reviewing the propriety of sanctions awarded under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1." The
supreme court held that, because neither plaintiffs nor their
counsel acted in bad faith, and because the first expert's conduct did not prejudice Toyota, the trial court had abused its
discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs' action.

41. 252 Va. 30, 471 S.E.2d 485 (1996).
42. Id. at 31-32, 471 S.E.2d at 486.
43. Id. at 32-33, 471 S.E.2d at 487.

44. Id. at 33, 471 S.E.2d at 487.
45. Id.
46. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 488.
47. Id. at 34, 471 S.E.2d at 488 (citing Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 287,
402 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991)).
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3. Written Summaries of Evidence
In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Puryear,4 the plaintiff
attempted to recover for hearing loss he claimed to have sustained while working on the defendant's locomotives over a
number of years. In support of his claims, the plaintiff introduced into evidence a written summary of his testimony concerning the amount of time that he had spent on locomotives
which he and his expert regarded as excessively noisy.49 The
plaintiff also introduced a chart summarizing the expert's testimony about his calculations of the plaintiff's periods of exposure
to the excessively noisy locomotives."0
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that it was reversible
error to have admitted these two summaries "of favorable parts
of oral testimony upon a contested issue.""' In so holding, the
supreme court distinguished its earlier decision in Petersen v.
Neme" on the ground that the assignment of error in that
case had related only to whether the plaintiffs testimony and a
summary of that testimony were admissible to prove causation.53 The supreme court explained that it had not decided in
Petersen "whether the plaintiffs summary of her testimony was
admissible as an exhibit."'
The supreme court in Puryear also distinguished its holding
from those of Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz"5 and Avocet
Development Corp. v. McLean Bank," both of which "approved
the introduction of exhibits that summarized voluminous documentary evidence that was not in dispute.""
The supreme court explained that if it allowed the introduction of summary charts, "jury trials could become a battle of
charts and summaries of oral testimony, shifting the jury's
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

250 Va. 559, 463 S.E.2d 442 (1995).
Id. at 561-62, 463 S.E.2d at 443.
Id. at 562, 463 S.E.2d at 443.
Id., 463 S.E.2d at 444.
222 Va. 477, 281 S.E.2d 869 (1981).
Puryear, 250 Va. at 562, 463 S.E.2d at 444.
Id.
245 Va. 255, 264, 427 S.E.2d 363, 368 (1993).
234 Va. 658, 667, 364 S.E.2d 757, 762 (1988).
Puryear, 250 Va. at 562, 463 S.E.2d at 444.
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attention away from traditional considerations of each witness's
credibility and the jury's obligation to decide the case based on
its collective recollection of all the evidence."58
4. Evidence of Criminal Conviction
In Godbolt v. Brawley,"9 the Supreme Court of Virginia further refined the body of law surrounding the circumstances
under which proof of a prior criminal conviction may be introduced in a civil trial arising out of the same conduct as that
leading to the criminal conviction. As a general rule, "'a judgment of conviction or acquittal... does not establish in a subsequent civil action the truth of the facts on which it was rendered.., and such judgment of conviction or acquittal is not
admissible in evidence.'" An exception to that rule exists
"when a plaintiff attempts to recover for a harm that is the
direct result of his or her own criminal conduct, and the dispositive issue in the civil action is the precise issue that the criminal conviction addressed."8 '
In Godbolt, the plaintiff had been convicted of simple assault
in connection with an incident in which he was shot by an offduty sheriffs deputy who was working as a security guard at a
nightclub. 2 The supreme court held that Godbolt's illegal activity "was not the direct cause of his injury."' The. direct
cause, the supreme court held, was the security guard's use of
deadly force." Consequently, even though the plaintiffs assaultive behavior led to the fight that escalated into the shooting in

58. Id. at 563, 463 S.E.2d at 444.
59. 250 Va. 467, 463 S.E.2d 657 (1995).
60. Id. at 470, 463 S.E.2d at 659 (quoting Smith v. New Dixie Lines, 201 Va.
466, 472, 111 S.E.2d 434, 438 (1959)).
61. Id. at 471, 463 S.E.2d at 660; see Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 404 S.E.2d 721
(1990) (holding that woman could not recover from partner for sexually transmitted
disease contracted during illegal, premarital intercourse); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va.
162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949) (finding that estate of woman who died during illegal abortion could not recover from doctor who performed procedure); Eagle, Star & British
Dominion Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927) (holding that arsonist
could not recover insurance proceeds for building he burned).
62. Godbolt, 250 Va. at 469, 463 S.E.2d at 658-59.
63. Id. at 472, 463 S.E.2d at 660.
64. Id.
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which plaintiff was wounded, it was error to bar his recovery
on the basis of his criminal conviction.65
D. Service of Process
In a pair of cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified
the application of Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3:3, which
states, in relevant part: "No judgment shall be entered against
a defendant who was served with process more than one year
after the commencement of the action against him unless the
court finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to
have timely service on him."6
In Gilbreath v. Brewster, 7 the supreme court held that dismissal of an action for lack of timely service was a dismissal
with prejudice." The supreme court rejected the argument
that the dismissal should be without prejudice because a dismissal under Rule 3:3 was not a determination of the merits.69
The supreme court also rejected the argument that a dismissal
with prejudice under Rule 3:3 would conflict with Virginia Code
section 8.01-229(E)(1), which tolls the statute of limitations for
the pendency of an action that is terminated "without determining the merits."" The supreme court explained that the
tolling statute applied "only when [a] claim can be refiled following a dismissal."71 Because a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 3:3 affects "only the viability of the claim," such a
dismissal does not conflict with the tolling statute.72
The supreme court reasoned that because "dismissal under
[Rule 3:3] requires a determination that the plaintiff did not

65. Id.
66. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:13(C).
67. 250 Va. 436, 463 S.E.2d 836 (1995).
68. Id. at 439, 463 S.E.2d at 837. The supreme court noted that although it had
directed that a dismissal for failure to make timely service be with prejudice in Dennis v. Jones, 240 Va. 12, 20, 393 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1990), "the nature of the dismissal" was not at issue in that case. Gilbreath, 250 Va. at 439 n.1, 463 S.E.2d at 837
n.1.
69. Gilbreath, 250 Va. at 440, 463 S.E.2d at 837.
70. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(1) (Repl.Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp.
1995)).
71. Id.
72. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 838.
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use due diligence in attempting to secure service," dismissal
without prejudice "would condone the plaintiff's lack of diligent
prosecution."73 The supreme court was also concerned that if
dismissal were without prejudice, "the tolling provisions of [Virginia] Code [section] 8.01-229(E)(1) could be invoked, allowing
repeated filings which effectively nullify the statute of limitations and potentially allow harassment of the defendant."74
In Frey v. Jefferson Homebuilders, Inc.,7 the supreme court
held that the provisions of Rule 3:3 regarding service within
one year were subject to the statutory extension of time provided by Virginia Code section 1-13.3:1, which states:
When the last day fixed by statute, or by rule of the Supreme Court of Virginia ...

for any paper to be served,

delivered or filed, or for any other act to be done in the
course of judicial proceedings falls on a Saturday, Sunday,
[or] legal holiday, ... the paper may be served, delivered,
or filed and the act may be done on the next day that is
not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. .

.

E. Nonsuits
In Conner v. Rose," a plaintiff who initially filed an action
in a general district court and took a nonsuit, refied the action
in circuit court and sought damages in the refied suit in excess
of the general district court's jurisdictional limits. On the
defendant's motion, the trial court transferred the refied action
to general district court.78 In holding that the plaintiff may
create a situation in which she could bring her refied suit in
circuit court simply by increasing her ad damnum to exceed the
general district court's jurisdictional limit of $10,000, the Supreme Court of Virginia found clear and unambiguous language

73. Id. at 441, 463 S.E.2d at 838.
74. Id. (citing W. HAMILTON BRYSON, HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE,
99-100 (2d ed. 1989); LEIGH B. MIDDLEDITCH, JR. & KENT SINCLAIR, VRGINIA CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 7.12, at 375-79 (2d ed. 1992)).

75. 251 Va. 375, 467 S.E.2d 788 (1996).
76. Id. at 378, 467 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.3:1 (Repl. VoL

1995)).
77. 252 Va. 57, 471 S.E.2d 478 (1996).
78. Id. at 58, 471 S.E.2d at 478.
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in Virginia Code section 8.01-380(A), which provides that
"'[after a nonsuit no new proceeding on the same cause of action or against the same party shall be had in any court other
than that in which the nonsuit was taken, unless that court is
without jurisdiction.'"79
F. Statutes of Limitation
In Harris *v. DiMattina,° the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered the effects of certain 1993 amendments to the medical malpractice claims procedure on two plaintiffs whose actions
had been dismissed as untimely. Effective July 1, 1993, Virginia Code section 8.01-581.2 was amended to delete the requirement that a notice of claim be served prior to instituting a
malpractice action against a health care provider.8 Also effective July 1, 1993, section 8.01-581.9 was repealed, thereby eliminating any tolling provision associated with the giving of a
notice of claim pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-581.2.82
Appellant Heather Harris ("Harris") alleged that she suffered
damages from medical malpractice on July 15, 1991. On July
13, 1993, Harris sent a notice of claim pursuant to former Virginia Code section 8.01-581.2 to the potential defendants.' No
one requested a medical malpractice review panel, and Harris
filed her motion for judgment on October 26, 1993. The trial
court dismissed the action as untimely under the two-year statute of limitations imposed by Virginia Code section 8.01243(A).84
Robert E. Cumberland ("Cumberland") alleged that he was
injured during, surgery on November 27, 1990 and during follow-up care that continued through January 9, 1991.'
Cumberland filed a notice of claim on December 2, 1992, and

79. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 478-79 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Repl. Vol.
1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996)).
80. 250 Va. 306, 462 S.E.2d 338 (1995).
81. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 928, 1993 Va. Acts, 1419 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-581.2 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
82. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 928, 1993 Va. Acts. 1419.
83. 250 Va. at 310, 462 S.E.2d at 339.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
85. Harris, 250 Va. at 311, 462 S.E.2d at 339.
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certain potential defendants requested a medical malpractice
review panel, which held a hearing and rendered its opinion on
September 10, 1993.86 On November 4, 1993, Cumberland filed
his motion for judgment, which was dismissed as barred by the
statute of limitations.
To resolve the issues raised by Harris and Cumberland on
appeal, the supreme court first held that former Virginia Code
sections 8.01-581.2 and -581.9, as well as the provision repealing 8.01-581.9, "are procedural in nature, since they control
only the method of obtaining redress or enforcement of rights
and do not involve the creation of duties, rights, and obligations."87 Accordingly, "neither plaintiff acquired any vested
right in these statutes at the time their causes of action accrued."s
After determining that the statutes in question were "procedural" in nature, the supreme court addressed the effect of
Virginia Code section 1-16, which states, in relevant part:
No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, as
to ...

any right accrued, or claim arising under the former

law, or in any way whatever to affect... any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect; save
only that the proceedings thereafter had shall conform, so
far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such
proceedings..

89

Because the changed statutes were procedural, "the changes
did not operate to repeal or in any way affect any act done, any
right accrued, or any claim arising under the former law." °
Moreover, the proceedings in the trial court "conformed to the
terms of the 1993 enactments," which were in effect at the time
the actions were dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.9
86. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 340.
87. Id. at 312, 462 S.E.2d at 340 (citing Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 120, 319
S.E.2d 750, 753-54 (1984)).

88. Id. (citing Fletcher v. Tarasidis, 219 Va. 658, 661, 250 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1979);
Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 Va. 134, 139, 235 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1977); Phipps v. Sutherland,
201 Va. 448, 453, 111 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1959)).
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-16 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
90. Harris, 250 Va. at 313, 462 S.E.2d at 341.
91. Id.

1272

uNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1259

The supreme court considered the effect of Virginia Code
section 8.01-1, which provides, in relevant part:
[A]ll provisions of this title shall apply to causes of action
which arose prior to the effective date of any such provisions; provided, however, that the applicable law in effect
on the day before the effective date of the particular provisions shall apply if in the opinion of the court any particular provision (i) may materially change the substantive
rights of a party (as distinguished from the procedural
aspects of the remedy) or (ii) may cause the miscarriage of
justice.2
The supreme court opined that the statute gave the trial
court "discretionary authority to apply the law that was in
effect on the day before the statutory changes occurred.""3 The
supreme court therefore reviewed the trial court's refusal to
apply section 8.01-1 under an abuse of discretion standard.94
In Harris' case, the supreme court held that no miscarriage
of justice existed because Harris "could have filed a motion for
judgment instead of a notice of claim on July 13, 1993, a date
within the original two-year limitation period." 5 In contrast,
the supreme court held that the dismissal of Cumberland's
action constituted a "miscarriage of justice" within the meaning
of 8.01-1 because, at the time Cumberland gave his notice of
claim, former section 8.01-581.2 prohibited him from filing suit
until after the applicable statutory waiting period had expired."5 The supreme court majority ignored the defendant's
reasoning that Cumberland had not been prejudiced by the
change in the law because the change allowed Cumberland to
file his motion for judgment at any time within the remaining
limitations period after July 1, 1993, regardless of whether the
medical review proceeding were still pending."

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-1 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
Harris, 250 Va. at 314, 462 S.E.2d at 341.
Id.
Id. at 316, 462 S.E.2d at 342.
Id. at 317, 462 S.E.2d at 343.
Id. at 319-20, 462 S.E.2d at 344 (Lacy, J., dissenting).

1996]

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

1273
1

G. Validity of Judgments
1. Full Faith and Credit
In Orchard Management Co. v. Soto," the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered whether default judgments for breach of
contract, entered in a Puerto Rican court against seven Virginia
apple growers ("the Growers") in favor of thirty-three migrant
farm workers ("the Workers"), should be given full faith and
credit in Virginia. The Growers argued that the Puerto Rican
court lacked in personam jurisdiction over them and thus that
the default judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit.99
The supreme court found that the Growers' attempts to secure
workers from Puerto Rico, including the filing of certain forms
related to securing migrant labor and the use of the Puerto
Rican Labor Department to recruit and screen workers, constituted sufficient "minimum contacts" with Puerto Rico to establish jurisdiction.' 0
2. Collateral Attack
0 the Supreme Court of Virginia evaluIn Parrish v. Jessee,"'
ated the power of a circuit court to revisit issues decided by another circuit court in connection with a court-approved settlement of an action on behalf of a person under a disability.
After Douglas Parrish ("Douglas") was severely injured in an
automobile accident, the Circuit Court of Goochland County
appointed Sandra Parrish ("Parrish"), Douglas' wife, as his
guardian. In that capacity, Parrish filed suit in the Circuit
Court of the City of Richmond to recover damages on Douglas'
behalf. The parties to that suit reached a compromise, which
was submitted to the Richmond court for approval pursuant to

Virginia Code section 8.01-424. °2

98. 250 Va. 343, 463 S.E.2d 839 (1995).
99. Id. at 350, 463 S.E.2d at 843.
100. Id. at 355-57, 463 S.E.2d at 846-47 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
101. 250 Va. 514, 464 S.E.2d 141 (1995).
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-424 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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After Douglas' sister, E. Ann Jessee ("Jessee"), was substituted as Douglas' guardian, she instituted a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Goochland County to vacate as void that portion
of the approved settlement agreement that provided for payment of settlement proceeds to persons other than Douglas. 3
The Goochland court held that the designation of payees other
than Douglas was improper under Virginia Code section 8.01424. On appeal, Parrish challenged the Goochland court's jurisdiction to set aside provisions of the settlement agreement approved by the Richmond court."°4
The supreme court held that the Richmond court's alleged
misapplication of section 8.01-424 rendered its order approving
settlement voidable, but not void." 5 The supreme court explained that "[tlhe validity of a judgment based upon a challenge to the application of a statute raises a question of trial
error, and not a question of jurisdiction."'
The supreme court did hold, however, that the Goochland
court's control over Douglas' estate, derived from its power to
appoint and supervise guardians, 7 authorized the Goochland
court to direct that payments made for Douglas' benefit under
the settlement
agreement be paid directly to the Goochland
10 8
court.

H. Immunity
1. Charitable Immunity
In Moore v. Warren,'"9 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a volunteer driver for the American Red Cross was entitled
to raise a plea of charitable immunity in defense of an action to
recover for injuries sustained by a patient being transported by
the volunteer. The supreme court reasoned that the rationale

103. Parrish, 250 Va. at 520, 464 S.E.2d at 145.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 522, 464 S.E.2d at 146.
106. Id. at 521, 464 S.E.2d at 145-46 (citing Paster v. Town of Berryville, 157 Va.
859, 864, 161 S.E. 58, 60 (1931)).
107. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-132 (Repl. Vol. 1996).

108. Parrish,250 Va. at 523, 464 S.E.2d at 146-47.
109. 250 Va. 421, 463 S.E.2d 459 (1995).
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for the doctrine of charitable immunity in Virginia-to encourage charitable activities-militated the extension of the immunity to charitable volunteers."' "If the charity's servants and
agents are not under the umbrella of immunity given the institution itself and they are exposed to negligence actions by the
charity's beneficiaries, the 'good work' of the charity will be
adversely impacted."'
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court maintained that its resolution of the issue was "not
an expansion" of the doctrine of charitable immunity but merely
"another instance of defining its contours.""
2. Statutory Immunity in Connection with Maintenance of
Recreational Property
In City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen,"' the Supreme Court
of Virginia considered whether a municipality with responsibility for maintaining a public stairway providing beach access
could invoke the protection of Virginia Code section 29.1-509,
which states:
A landowner shall owe no duty of care to keep land or
premises safe for entry or use by others for ...recreational
use.... No landowner shall be required to give any warn-

ing of hazardous conditions or uses of, structures on, or
activities on such land or premises to any person entering
on the land or premises for such purposes. ..."'
The statute defines "landowner" to include any "person in control of land or premises."" 5 The supreme court looked to the
"clear legislative intent" of the statute--"to encourage the opening of private land to public recreational use"-and concluded
that there was no reason not to include a municipal corporation
6
within the meaning of "person" under the statute."

110. Id. at 423, 463 S.E.2d at 460.

111. Id.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 425, 463 S.E.2d at 461.
251 Va. 358, 467 S.E.2d 471 (1996).
VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-509(B) (C=m. Supp. 1996).
VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-509(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
Flippen, 251 Va. at 362, 467 S.E.2d at 473.
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I. Virginia Tort Claims Act
In Halberstam v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld a trial court's dismissal of a slip-and-fall action
because the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice provisions
of the Virginia Tort Claims Act, which states:
Every claim cognizable against the Commonwealth...
shall be forever barred unless the claimant or his agent,
attorney or representative has filed a written statement of
the nature of the claim, which includes the time and place
at which the injury is alleged to have occurred and the
agency or agencies alleged to be liable.... The claimant or
his agent, attorney or representative shall, in a claim cognizable against the Commonwealth, mail the notice of claim
via the United States Postal Service by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the Director of the
Division of Risk Management of the Attorney General in
Richmond."'
In Halberstam, the plaintiff was injured when she tripped on a
pothole in a parking lot at George Mason University. A March
14, 1994 certified letter from her counsel to the Division of Risk
Management stated that Halberstam, a student at George Mason University, had been injured on October 5, 1993 "in the
school parking lot" when a defect in the asphalt caused her to
fall." 9
The supreme court held that Halberstam's claim was barred
because the March 14 notice did not "specify the location of the
injury."" Because George Mason University has more than
one parking lot, the court felt that the notice's "lack of detail
[was], in essence, no notice at all.""2 The supreme court also
held that additional detail supplied in other correspondence
could not salvage Halberstam's claim because only the March
14 letter "was sent to an official designated in the statute and

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

251 Va. 248, 467 S.E.2d 783 (1996).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.6 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
Halberstam, 251 Va. at 249-50, 467 S.E.2d at 784.
Id. at 251, 467 S.E.2d at 785.
Id.
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in the manner prescribed by the statute, certified mail with a
return receipt requested."w
The supreme court's holding leaves open the question of precisely what level of detail would have satisfied the notice
statute's requirements. If Halberstam's notice had indicated in
which parking lot the injury had occurred, but had failed to
designate which particular parking space was involved, would
the notice have adequately described the "place" where the accident occurred? The supreme court's ruling provides no guidance
on that question.
HI. RECENT LEGISLATION AFFECTING CIVIL PRACTICE

The General Assembly enacted a number of measures during
its 1996 session which affect civil litigation in state courts.'
For ease of reference, the discussion of these enactments is
classified below by subject matter.
A. Amendments to Pleadings
The General Assembly has amended the Virginia Code to
allow amendments to pleadings to relate back to the date of
original filing for statute of limitations purposes iff (i) the claim
or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original
pleading, (ii) the amending party was reasonably diligent in asserting the amended claim or defense; and (iii) parties opposing
the amendment will not be substantially prejudiced in litigating
on the merits as a result of the timing of the amendment.'
The new statute does not apply to eminent domain or
mechanics' lien claims or defenses.' In a related provision,
the statute governing amendment of pleadings to change the
names of parties was broadened to include changing the names
of parties for reasons other than misnomer. 6

122. Id. at 252, 467 S.E.2d at 785.
123. Unless otherwise indicated, all provisions became effective on July 1, 1996.
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
125. Id.
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6 (Cum.

Supp. 1996).
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B. Accrual of Rights of Action
In a change recommended by the Boyd-Graves Conference,
the statute governing accrual of actions was amended to establish that, as had been the case for actions for injury to the
person, actions for damage to property accrue when the injury
occurs, rather than when the duty in question is breached.'
C. Service of Process
The statute governing service of process was amended to
make clear that private process servers may serve process without first obtaining authorization from the court.' More importantly, statutory changes now permit private process servers
to serve writs of execution and garnishments.' This change
should greatly facilitate collection efforts, where it is often prejudicial to the creditor to wait for normal service by the sheriff.
The statutes governing the manner of making returns on
service of process were amended to provide that process servers
must include their names, addresses, and phone numbers on
their returns and must make return to the clerk's office within
seventy-two hours of service, excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. 30
D. Evidence
1. Judicial Records
The General Assembly has abolished the requirement that
foreign court records be authenticated by both the clerk of the
foreign court and a judge of that court in order to be received
as prima facie evidence in Virginia courts. The statute now
requires only authentication by the foreign court's clerk.'

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

VA.
VA.
VA.
VA.
VA.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§ 8.01-230 (Cum.
§ 8.01-293 (Cum.
§§ 8.01-466, -511
§ 8.01-325 (Cum.
§ 8.01-389 (Cum.

Supp.
Supp.
(Repl.
Supp.
Supp.

1996).
1996).
Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
1996).
1996).
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Additionally, a new enactment provides that an official records custodian's affidavit stating "that after a diligent search,
no record or entry of such record is found to exist among the
records in his office is admissible as evidence that his office has
no such record or entry."32
The statute creating a presumption as to the reasonableness
and authenticity of medical bills introduced into evidence was
broadened to apply to such bills introduced in actions for medical expense benefits payable under motor vehicle insurance
policies.' Likewise, a statutory amendment now allows use of
medical records in evidence, upon sworn statement of the custodian, under certain circumstances in general district court actions involving disputes with health care providers." The
statute had previously applied only to personal injury actions
and disputes with insurance companies.
E. Docketing of Judgments and Recordation of Other Papers
The statute governing the docketing of judgments was
amended to require that all judgments docketed on and after
July 1, 1996 must include inter alia the full names of all parties and the dates of birth of all persons against whom the
judgment was rendered, together with the case numbers of the
actions in which the judgments were rendered. 3 '
The statute governing recordings in the clerk's office now
provides that the clerk may refuse to accept for filing or recordation any writing that does not contain on the first page of
any document drafted in the Commonwealth "an entry showing
the name of either the person or entity who drafted the instru7
ment. . .

132.
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134.
135.
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VA.
VA.

CODE
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ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§
§
§
§
§

8132.12.01-390(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
8.01413.01 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
16.1-88.2 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
16.1-88.2 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
8.01-449 (Cum. Supp. 1996).

137. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-59 (RepL Vol. 1996).

